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authors.                                                         Executive Summary 
 
Analysis of higher education quality has become a central issue in light of UK  government 
policies to  introduce variable fees  and to  encourage more and more  young people to  attend 
university.  In this context, an important question is whether institutional quality is reflected in 
labour market earnings. Such information could help to inform students, teachers and policy 
makers. However, empirical analysis of the link between institutional quality and labour market 
outcomes is rare outside the US.  
 
In this study we offer an empirical analysis of labour market returns to measures of institutional 
quality. We exploit the Graduate Cohort Studies for 1985, 1990, 1995 and 1999. We use data 
from the Higher Education Statistics Agency to obtain information about institutional quality. 
We  use  five  different  measures  of  quality:  research  assessment  exercise  (RAE)  score;  the 
faculty-student ratio; the retention rate; the total tariff score (which is based on A-levels or other 
eligible qualifications); mean faculty salary and expenditure per pupil. We explore how these 
variables can be combined to an aggregate proxy for quality. We attempt to control for all other 
variables that might influence both the quality of institution attended by the graduate and his/her 
wage. Like all studies in this literature, our analysis relies on an (untestable) assumption that 
relevant variables have not been omitted. 
 
Our key finding is that there is a positive return to attending a higher quality institution for most 
of the indicators, which is similar to what US studies have found. The earnings differential from attending a higher quality institution is about 6 per cent on average, when using an overall proxy 
for quality based on a combination of the measures.   
 
We also examine whether it makes a difference if an individual attends an institution in the 
second, third or fourth quartile of the quality distribution, as compared to an institution in the 
first  (lowest)  quartile.  Results  suggest  that  if  a  student  attends  an  institution  in  the  highest 
quartile of the RAE score, the retention rate or the total tariff, this leads to higher wages between 
10 percent and 16 percent, compared to an individual who attends an institution in the lowest 
quartile. However, if an individual attends an institution in the second highest quartile of quality, 
the earning differential drops to 5-7 percent in comparison to the bottom ranked institutions. We 
also find that returns to institutional quality have increased over time, though within a modest 
range.       
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We examine the links between various measures of university quality and graduate earnings 
in the United Kingdom. We explore the implications of using different measures of quality 
and combining them into an aggregate measure. Our findings suggest a positive return to 
university quality with an average earnings differential of about 6 percent for a one standard 
deviation rise in university quality. However, the relationship between university quality and 
wages is highly non-linear, with a much higher return at the top of the distribution. There is 
some indication that returns may be increasing over time.        
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JEL Classification: I23; J24 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Analysis of the quality of higher education in the UK has become a very important issue in 
the light of government policies to introduce variable fees and to encourage more and more 
young people to attend university. The analysis of university quality is also important to 
parents and students when they make decisions about which university to attend. Questions 
arise as to whether different measures of institutional quality are reflected in labour market 
outcomes of graduates such as earnings, employment, or occupational positions. A recent 
survey of students in state schools found that about half believed there was no difference in 
                                                           
1 We are grateful for funding from the Economic and Social Research Council via its Teaching and 
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his help in using the Graduate Cohort Surveys for 1985 and 1990. We thank Lynsey Pooler, Dominic 
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the  earnings  potential  of  obtaining  a  qualification  in  different  institutions  of  higher 
education.
2 While US research would suggest this conclusion is the wrong one, there is little 
UK research to guide students, teachers and policy makers about this issue.  
In an attempt to fill this  gap in the literature, we use  Graduate Cohort Studies to 
estimate returns to measures of higher education institution quality, while controlling for 
other observable characteristics of graduates. In particular, we closely follow the analysis of 
Black and Smith (2006), applying some of their approaches in a UK setting. We find 
comparable estimates of returns to institutional quality . There is also some indication that 
returns may be increasing over time. We also find some evidence of a non-linear relationship 
between measures of institutional quality and wages.  
We start by a brief review of the literature (Section 2) before describing the data used 
in this study (Section 3). We then explain our empirical approach (Section 4) and discuss our 
estimates (Section 5). We then present our conclusions (Section 6).    
 
2.  Previous Literature 
Since the 1990s, the literature on analyzing the impact of university quality on students’ 
subsequent labour market outcomes has seen a rapid increase. However, most of the research 
has been conducted in the US. There are two main questions that researchers have to consider 
when examining the role of the institutional quality on graduate labour market earnings. The 
first  is  on  how  to  measure  ‘quality’;  and  the  second  is  how  to  eliminate  the  effect  of 
unobserved characteristics that influence the probability of admission.  
Regarding the first question, early studies have used a measure of average ability of 
an institution’s intake as a measure of quality or prestige. This is typically measured by the 
                                                           
2 The survey was carried out by PeopleSurve on behalf of CitizenCard. 3113 CitizenCard holders (between age 
11 and 24) were asked to complete an online questionnaire. (Source: Sutton Trust Press Release, 21 May 2008). 3 
 
average SAT scores of first  year undergraduates. They find  evidence of that institutional 
quality has a significantly positive impact  on earnings.
3 The question has been raised  on 
whether a single proxy variable for college quality is a valid measure of university quality.  
Black and Smith (2006) examine whether using the SAT score as a proxy for quality is valid 
and find estimates to suggest that such studies understate the effect of institutional quality on 
wages. At the same time, they find the SAT score to be the  most reliable signal of quality. 
More  recent  studies  have  attempted  to  broaden   the  definition  of  university  quality  by 
including a variety of institutional characteristics besides  average ability (Black and Smith 
(2006, 2004), Black, Kermit and Smith (2005), Dale and Krueger (2002).  
   The  second  challenge  that  researchers  face  when  anal ysing  the  links  between 
institutional  quality  and  labour  market  outco mes  is  that  unobserved  characteristics  of 
individuals may be related both to their academic achievements in university and to their 
earnings. Studies attempt to control for many factors that might influence  graduate earnings 
in the labour market. For example, Brewer, Eide and Ehrenberg (1999) model student choice 
of the type of the institution attended,  using information such as  the net costs of attending 
different institutions, and student’s academic background. However, attending high quality 
institutions is found to have an effect on wages even after controlling for such factors.  
   The  most  problematic  issue  is  how  to  deal  with  attributes  of  entrants  to  higher 
education institutions that may be either unmeasured or poorly measured in available data 
sets (such as ability). Students of high ability may select (and be selected) into the more elite 
institutions. If such students earn more in the future, it is not easy to distinguish how much of 
this is due to the fact they attended higher quality institutions or how much of it is due to their 
higher  average  ability.  The  studies  cited  above  rely  on  a  ‘selection  on  observables’ 
                                                           
3 The early literature is summarized by Brewer and Ehrenberg (1996) 4 
 
assumption, which means that students are selected into institutions on the basis of variables 
observed by the analyst. This approach is justified by authors on the basis that they have a 
rich set of conditioning variables. Dale and Krueger (2002) is one of the few studies that have 
attempted to deal with the selection problem in a different way. They adjust for selection on 
the part of schools by comparing earnings and other outcomes among students who applied to 
and were accepted and rejected by a comparable set of institutions. They find that students 
who attended more selective colleges do not earn more than other students. However, they 
find a positive internal rate of return from attending a college with higher resources.  
In general, as stated above, studies find evidence for a positive effect of measures of 
‘college  quality’  on  the  subsequent  wages  of  graduates.  However,  this  conclusion  is  not 
unanimous and there are a number of controversial issues. Black et al. (2005) point out that 
findings of positive effects of college quality on earnings are not surprising, until one reflects 
on similar studies  for schools, where it is  difficult to  find a relationship  between school 
resources and educational attainment (Hanushek, 2003). They conjecture that the difference 
in  the  effectiveness  of  inputs  results  from  differences  in  market  structure  –  the  higher 
education market is increasingly competitive in the US while the primary and secondary 
school  market  is  less  so.  Therefore,  they  suggest  that  the  finding  of  positive  returns  to 
‘college quality’ in the US literature may not generalize to countries with highly centralized 
university systems. This is something about which there is almost no empirical evidence. 
Furthermore, the UK system of higher education is more centralized than the US, with fewer 
private  institutions  and  up  until  recently,  no  possible  differentiation  between  public 
universities in the extent of fees.
4 
                                                           
4 Following the 2004 Higher Education Act, variable tuition fees started in 2006/07. However, most institutions 
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One of the few related studies attempts to look at this issue in the UK (Chevalier and 
Conlon, 2003), where quality is measured by whether the university is part of an elite group 
of older universities (‘the Russell Group’). Their findings do suggest some positive effect of 
institutional quality on later earnings. However, the estimates are imprecisely determined and 
sensitive to specification. Power and Whitty (2008) follow a cohort of graduates over time 
and show (descriptively) that those who attended elite universities earn more in the labour 
market. A recent study by Chevalier (2009) follows a similar approach to that applied in this 
paper. He uses a recently available survey of graduates who left higher education in 2003. 
His findings are consistent with those reported here. An advantage of the surveys used in this 
paper is that it is possible to examine returns for different cohorts of students. 
Lindahl  and  Regnér  (2005)  look  at  this  question  for  Sweden.  They  use  detailed 
administrative  data  that  allow  one  to  control  for  unobserved  family  and  neighbourhood 
characteristics. They find significant ‘within family’ effects on earnings, i.e. a premium that 
appears to differ between siblings depending on where each person went to college. They 
find that this ‘college effect’ is correlated with teacher quality, as measured by the proportion 
of teachers with a doctoral degree.  
In summary, on the whole, available evidence suggests that college quality has an 
effect on earnings. However, this is an area where much more evidence is needed, especially 
for countries outside the US. 
 
3.  Data 
This analysis is based on four cohorts of graduates (though focusing most on the most recent 
cohort): 1985, 1990, 1995 and 1999. The 1995 and 1999 cohorts were surveyed (respectively) 
3 and 4 years after graduation and are most comparable in terms of the methodology and the 
institutions that were used (the surveys were conducted by the same researchers and they 6 
 
were  deliberately  designed  to  be  similar).  The  1985  and  1990  cohorts  were  surveyed 
(respectively) 11 and 6 years after leaving university. For both these cohorts we use wages 
six years after graduation.
5  
  All the surveys are postal surveys. The aim of the 1995 version was to obtain 
information from five per cent of the population of 1995 qualified leavers from higher 
education institutions in the UK.
6 Sampling was conducted via a two -stage strategy. In the 
first stage, a sample of 50 of the targeted institutions was drawn at random, checking that the 
known characteristics of leavers against those of the target population.
7  In the second stage, a 
sample of leavers was drawn from each institution (that agreed to take part), initially with a 
common sampling frame of 50 per cent. For the 1999 survey, it was  decided to invite the 
same sample of institutions to participate (so as to achieve comparability)  – although four 
new institutions were added. In total 33 institutions took part in the 1995 survey and 38 in the 
1999 survey. The overall response rates to the 1995 and 1999 surveys were 30 per cent and 
24 per cent respectively. Elias (1999) discusses the representativeness of the surveys and 
shows that female students and mature students are over-represented and ethnic minority 
students under-represented compared with the population. They find that the survey data and 
HESA data correspond well in the following subject areas – Law, Maths and Computing, 
Engineering, Business Studies and ‘Other Vocational subjects’. Subjects which are under-
represented are Arts (-2%), Languages (-5%) and Natural Sciences (-4%). Subjects which are 
over-represented are Humanities (+5%), Social Sciences (+4%) and Interdisciplinary subjects 
(+2%). 
                                                           
5  Those  graduating  from  university  in  1985  were  asked  retrospective  questions  about  wages  6  years  after 
graduation. There are relatively few unemployed graduates in any of the cohorts.  
6 Those who had studied at specialist medical schools and colleges and other specialist institutions (art/design 
colleges, agricultural colleges) were not included.   Information about the methodology is taken  from Elias 
(1999). 
7 HESA records for the 50 institutions were used to establish that these institutions were broadly typical of the 
population in terms of gender, regional distribution, age, and type of institution.  7 
 
  Of most importance to us is that the institutions in these surveys are representative of 
the broader population in terms of our measures of institutional quality. Our measures of 
institutional  quality  are  as  follows:  the  RAE  (Research  Assessment  Exercise)  score;  the 
faculty-student ratio; the retention rate; the total tariff score (i.e. score based on A-levels or 
other eligible qualifications); mean faculty salary; expenditure per pupil.
8 We show this in 
Table 1 and find that the institutions represented in the 1999 survey are very similar (and 
statistically indistinguishable) from all institutions. In Table 2, we show summary statistics of 
institutional characteristics from the survey of 1985 and 1990 graduates (22 institutions) 
alongside those from the 1995 and 1999 surveys (33 and 36 institutions respectively).
9  The 
institutions  sampled  in   1985/90  look  similar  to  those  sampled  in  1995/99  on  most 
dimensions. However, the RAE score is lower than for 1995/99. Thus, we should interpret 
our findings that use all four surveys with caution (which would be a concern in any case on 
account of the smaller number of institutions used for the first two surveys). 
 
4.  Conceptual Framework and Empirical Approach 
Our  analytical  framework  is  the  education  production  function,  where  wages  W  are  a 
function of a vector of university quality measures, Q, and individual characteristics, X:  W = 
f(Q, X). In this case the quality of the higher education institution is represented by a vector 
of k characteristics so that Q=(q1,…, qm). The parameters of interest are the partial effects of 
the quality variables on wages: δW/δqk, k = 1, .., m. 
  To implement this model, we linearise the production function as follows: 
                                                           
8 The measures used are not contemporaneous. In general, we use values of these measures of quality based on 
their value in 2004. We use measures that are almost contemporaneous for the RAE score (1996 and 2001) with 
regard  to  the  GCS  surveys  in  1995  and  1999.  We  have  undertaken  some  sensitivity  analysis  using  more 
contemporaneous measures of expenditure per pupil. This makes little difference to our results. It is not possible 
to improve on what we have done in this respect with regard to either the RAE score (due to the fact that the 
newer of the HEIs were not assessed prior to 1996) and the total tariff (a fairly recent variable in HESA).  
9 The methodology used to select institutions was different for the 1985/90 survey to that conducted in 1995 and 
1999. This is explained by Belfield et al. (1997), who show that some characteristics of those surveyed are 
similar to the wider university population.  8 
 
Wit = ß0 + ß1Qit + ß3Xit + εit      (1) 
where Wit is the log wage of individual i at time t; Q, the quality of the higher education 
institution, is represented by a vector of characteristics described in the previous section; X is 
a  vector  of  individual-level  characteristics,  which  include  demographics  (age  and  age 
squared; gender; whether non-white); parental background (mother and father’s educational 
qualifications;  whether  mother  works;  whether  father  works);  and  characteristics  of  the 
individual’s  education/educational  achievement  (A-level  points  score;  whether  attended 
private school; subject of degree at university). In some specifications, we also control for 
class  of  degree.
10  ε  is  an  error  term,  which  we  assume  to  be  normally  distributed  and 
uncorrelated with any variable in Q, which also influences wages. Thus, like most of the 
literature, we assume ‘selection on observables’, which means that all variables that influence 
Q and wages are fully captured by the available control variables. In practice, this assumption 
means that the influence of unobserved factors such as motivation and ambition (on choice of 
university and wages) are fully captured by observed variables (e.g. A-level points score, 
subject of degree, parental characteristics etc.).  
As noted by Black and Smith (2006) most previous studies employ a single measure 
of university quality in regression equations such as (1). Implicit in such an analysis is the 
idea that university quality can be captured by some latent unobserved quality measure q
*, so 
that W = f(q
*, X). A single observed measure, q1 say, then proxies the latent quality. Two 
issues arise in interpreting the parameter of interest, δW/δq
*. First, even if such a model is 
held to be tenable, q1 likely measures true quality imperfectly and hence in the presence of 
classical measurement error, coefficient estimates of quality will be attenuated. Second, and 
perhaps more importantly, university quality is very likely a multi-dimensional attribute. For 
                                                           
10 Estimates of the effect of university quality on wages are unaffected by controlling for class of degree. We 
do not control for this in our main specifications as it is itself an outcome of the university attended. 9 
 
example,  institutions  may  specialize,  so  that  some  excel  in  sciences  and  others  in  arts 
subjects. Furthermore, institutions which perform badly on some measures such as research 
quality (as measured by our ‘RAE’ measure) but do well on others, such as teaching quality 
(arguably proxied by student retention rates). Thus it seems important to incorporate multiple 
measures of quality in this analysis. 
  However, whilst incorporating multiple measures of quality in the regression analysis 
is  conceptually  appealing,  this  does  create  a  problem  of  estimation.  Since  the  university 
quality measures are highly correlated with one another multicollinearity issues will arise and 
the estimates on the individual coefficients will be imprecise and difficult to interpret. As 
shown in Table 3 for the 1999 survey, apart from mean faculty salary (which is weakly – and 
sometimes negatively - correlated with most indicators), the correlations range from 0.44 to 
0.89.  We follow two of the strategies used by Black and Smith (2006) – using factor analysis 
to  combine  the  various  measures  to  obtain  a  measure  of  Q;  and  using  an  Instrumental 




5.  Estimates of Wage Returns to Quality 
In  Table  4,  we  present  OLS  regressions  for  the  1999  cohort  where  we  include  quality 
measures separately and together, with and without controlling for other variables. Results 
are reported in two panels. Panel A shows estimates of the effect of quality measures on log 
wages without including any other controls. Columns (1) to (6) reports results where each 
quality measure is included separately. Then in column (7), the quality measures are included 
together.  In Panel  B, we replicate these regressions  after including a  full set  of controls 
                                                           
11 See Black and Smith (2005) for detail about the methodology.  The correlations between the variables used in 
their analysis range from 0.31 to 0.70. They also explore the use of several other techniques, not used here. 10 
 
(discussed above).
12 We normalize each of the quality measures to  have unit variance (for 
ease of comparability). 
  Apart from mean faculty salary (which has a low coefficient and is never statistically 
significant), all the measures of quality have a positive and significant effect on log wages 
when included separately. It is interesting to observe how little difference the inclusion of a 
fairly rich set of controls makes in most of these regressions. When including controls, the 
coefficient  on  ‘quality’  ranges  from  2.99  to  4.68  when  quality  measures  are  included 
separately. An interpretation is that a 1 standard deviation increase in the quality of institution 
attended  raises  wages  by  2.99  and  4.68  percent  (conditional  on  the  assumptions  of  our 
analysis).  
As expected, the picture becomes blurred when all the quality measures are included 
together (in column 7). This reflects the high collinearity among variables. To improve on 
this approach, we need to turn to the factor analysis or the Instrumental Variable method. In 
Table 5, we show the result of combining factors together (i.e. factor analysis) and using the 
composite variable as a measure of institutional quality in the earnings regression. We show 
the results of using two factor models and models that combine all variables. In the two factor 
models,  the  range  of  estimates  increases  to  between  4.19  and  9.91,  depending  on  the 
measures used. In fact, similar measures produce almost exactly the same estimates as in the 
Black and Smith paper for the US (shown in Table 6).  In the models that combine all factors 
and all factors but the RAE (which is itself a score which takes account of a range of factors), 
the estimates are 5.3 and 6.46 respectively. Thus, it does seem that using only one measure of 
institutional quality in regressions leads to downward bias in earnings regressions.  At the 
same time, this estimate is not too far off that which arises from using the total tariff as the 
sole  measure  of  quality  (Table  4).  This  variable  corresponds  quite  closely  to  the  quality 
                                                           
12 The full regression results for Table 4, panel B, column 1 is reported in Appendix Table A1. 11 
 
measure most often used in US research (the SAT score). A similar story is revealed if other 
quality measures are used to instrument each separate quality measure. This is shown in 
Appendix Table A2. These estimates are close to the upper range (of about 6%) estimated by 
Conlon  and  Chevalier  (2003)  for  the  premium  attached  to  attending  a  Russell  Group 
university. 
   Two  other  issues  are  of  interest  here.  Firstly,  have  returns  to  institutional  quality 
changed  over  time?  Secondly,  is  the  measure  of  institutional  quality  linearly  related  to 
wages?  With regard to the first issue, we need to bear in mind that the sample of institutions 
used in the 1985/90 cohort study is smaller and does not have exactly the same characteristics 
(in  terms  of  quality)  compared  to  the  institutions  sampled  in  the  1995/99  surveys. 
Furthermore, sample sizes are fairly small in both cases.  Notwithstanding these caveats, it is 
interesting to observe an upward trend in the effect of institutional quality on wages. This is 
shown in Table 7. Also, within each pair of surveys, the point estimates increase over time - 
albeit within a modest range, which is not usually statistically significant. However, using the 
composite measure of quality (after factor analysis) and observing the evolution of the point 
estimate over time shows quite an impressive change in the effect of institutional quality on 
log wages. One reason for why one might expect returns to institutional quality to increase 
over time is the expansion of higher education. With a higher number of graduates available, 
it is plausible to think of an increasing premium being attached to the quality of institution 
attended. 
  A final question is whether or not these measures of quality have a linear effect on 
wages. To examine this, we re-define variables in terms of quartiles and analyse whether it 
makes a difference to wages if an individual attends an institution in the second, third or 
fourth (highest) quartile of the quality distribution, as compared to an institution in the first 
(lowest)  quartile.  Results  are  shown  in  Table  8.  The  regressions  suggest  a  non-linear 12 
 
relationship between measures of quality and wages. For example, if a student attends an 
institution in the highest quartile of the RAE score, the retention rate or the total tariff, this 
leads to higher wages of between 10 per cent and 16 per cent (depending on the measure) 
compared to an individual who attends an institution in the lowest quartile. However if he/she 
attends an institution the second highest quartile, the earnings differential is 5-7 per cent in 
comparison with the lowest quartile. There is a positive coefficient for at least some quality 
measures  when  comparing  an  individual  who  attends  an  institution in  the  second  lowest 
quartile and the lowest quartile. However, these differentials are not statistically significant. 
Thus,  the  main  driver  of  our  results  has  been  individuals  who  attend  higher  education 
institutions  in  the  top  quartile  of  the  distribution,  though  attending  an  institution  in  the 
second-highest quartile also has a benefit.
13 
      
6.  Conclusion 
We have considered whether the quality of institution attended has a payoff in the labour 
market in terms of subsequent wages. Our results suggest that there is a positive return, which 
is comparable to that found for the US. The magnitude of the return is fairly important as an 
earnings  differential  of  about  6  per  cent  for  attending  a  higher  quality  institution  (i.e.  1 
standard  deviation  higher  than  some  alternative)  adds  up  to  a  considerable  sum  over  a 
lifetime in the labour market.
14 For example, average earnings for graduates of the 1999 
cohort is £22,828. If we assume that the return to quality is 6 per  cent of this amount and 
(very conservatively) assume that this stays constant in absolute terms over his/her time in the 
labour market, this amounts to a net present value of £35,207 (assuming 25 years in the 
labour market and using a discount rate of 3.5%) . Although this is a high average return to 
                                                           
13 Note that this paper does not test the impact of attending a low quality institution relative to not attending 
such an institution at all. Our sample consists of university graduates only. 
14 A one standard deviation increase in the RAE score would mean an increase of about 1 where the scale i s 
from 2 to 5.5.  13 
 
quality, it is still small by comparison to the overall value of higher education (on average). 
Blundell et al. (2005) find that the average return to Higher Education is 48% (of earnings) in 
comparison with leaving school at age 16 with no qualifications. If we translate this into 
lifetime earnings in the same (very rough) way, this amounts to £281,594. Such evidence 
suggests that there is some justice in requiring graduates to contribute to the cost of their 
university education and allowing for differential fees because of a return to the quality of 
institution attended. Like most papers in this literature, our results are valid only under the 
(untestable) assumption that the control variables included in the regressions are sufficient to 
account for the fact that students observed attending high quality institutions are different 
from those attending lower quality institutions in all respects likely to influence wages. It is 
noteworthy that better data sets will, in the future, allow for more detailed controls to be 
included in analysis of this issue. Specifically, pupil-level administrative data sets can be 
linked from school to university admissions to university attended and then combined with 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Institutional Measures of Quality 
  Institutions in the 1999 Graduate 
Cohort Survey 
All higher education institutions 
(HESA, 2004) 
Research Assessment Exercise 
















Total Tariff (average pre-university 



















Table  2:  Summary  Statistics  of  Institutional  Quality  Measures  from  the  Graduate 
Cohort Surveys 
  1985/1990  1995  1999 
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Table 3: Correlation between Institutional Quality Variables (1999 cohort) 
 














Rae Score   1 
 
         
Faculty-Student 
Ratio 
0.728  1         
Retention Rate  0.769  0.443  1       









   
Mean Faculty Salary   -0.048  -0.376  0.051  -0.029  1   
Expendture per 
Student/10000  




Table 4.  Log Wage regressions for Graduate Cohort Study, 1999 
 
 
A. Regressions without other controls 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
RAE Score  4.65 
(1.55) 




  4.11 
(1.33) 
        -1.83 
(2.56) 
Retention Rate      4.93 
(1.53) 
      2.84 
(1.98) 
Total Tariff        5.52 
(1.53) 




        -1.27 
(1.65) 








N  6465  6465  6465  6465  6465  6465  6465 
R-Squared  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.00  0.02  0.03 
B. Regressions with controls 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
RAE Score  4.03 
(1.24) 




  2.99 
(1.09) 
        -1.42 
(2.11) 
Retention Rate      4.42 
(1.14) 
      2.77 
(1.66) 
Total Tariff        5.87 
(1.23) 




        -1.12 
(1.06) 








N  6465  6465  6465  6465  6465  6465  6465 
R-Squared  0.12  0.12  0.13  0.13  0.12  0.13  0.14 
 
Note:  Coefficients  reported  and  standard  errors  in  parenthesis.  All  coefficients  are  multiplied  by  100;  and 
standard errors are clustered at the institution level. The institution quality measures are normalised to have unit 
variance. Controls include the individual’s A-level points score, gender, age and age squared, whether mother 
works; whether father works; whether attended private school; whether non-white; whether father (mother) is 
educated to degree level, has some higher education, O-levels, number of O-levels; A-levels; Dummies for 




Table 5: Factor Analysis  
 
Two Variable Models 
Factor combines faculty student ratio and the retention rate  7.24 
(1.79) 
Factor combines faculty-student  ratio and total tariff score  6.52 
(1.42) 
Factor combines retention rate and total tariff  6.35 
(1.29) 
Factor combines retention rate and total tariff  5.38 
(1.32) 
Factor combines retention rate and RAE score  9.91 
(3.84) 
Factor combines faculty student ratio and expenditure per pupil  4.19    
(1.38) 
Factor combines retention rate and expenditure per pupil    7.65    
(1.58) 
Factor combines total tariff and expenditure per pupil  6.95    
(1.27) 
Factor combines RAE score and expenditure per pupil    5.39    
(1.45) 
Factor combines total tariff and RAE score  5.65    
(1.26) 
Factor combines retention rate and RAE  5.37    
(1.32) 
Factor combines staff salary and expenditure per pupil  5.53    
(2.05) 
Factor combines staff salary and RAE  9.91    
(3.84) 
Factor combines faculty student ratio and RAE score  4.57 
(1.38) 
Five (or more) Variable Models 
Factor combines all quality indicators apart from RAE score  6.46 
(1.21) 
Factor combines all quality indicators including RAE score  5.30 
(1.21) 
Note: includes controls as in Table 4. 
 
Table 6: Comparison with Black and Smith (2006) 
 
Two Variable Models 
  Our estimates  Black and Smith’s 
estimate* 




Factor combines faculty-student  ratio and total tariff score 





Factor combines retention rate and total tariff 





*Coefficients and standard errors multiplied by 100 19 
 
 
Table 7: Estimated coefficients from using different Graduate Cohort Surveys 
 
           
  1985  1990  1995  1999 
 




























































All factors apart 






















N  2435  3744  6612  6465 
Note: includes controls as in Table 4. 20 
 
Table 8: Wage regressions when measuring institutional quality by ranking in the 
distribution compared to lowest quartile 
 






























































R-squared  0.13  0.12  0.12  0.13  0.12  0.13 
See notes to Table 4.  N=6465. All controls included 21 
 
Appendix Table A1: 
Log Wage Regressions for 1999 Graduate Cohort Study, Full Set of Controls 
 
    
RAE score  4.03 
  (1.24) 
A-level point score tercile = 2  1.37 
  (1.85) 
A-level point score tercile = 3  6.52 
  (1.67) 
Female  -10.73 
  (1.38) 
Age  11.98 
  (11.77) 
Age squared  -0.18 
  (0.22) 
Father works  0.76 
  (2.58) 
Mother works  1.67 
  (1.33) 
Attended private sechool  8.06 
  (1.84) 
Non-white  4.40 
  (3.24) 
Mother education = degree  2.27 
  (2.37) 
Mother education = some higher education  -0.35 
  (2.31) 
Mother education = A-levels  3.45 
  (1.93) 
Mother education = O-levels  3.01 
  (2.28) 
Mother education = no O-levels  3.12 
  (2.49) 
Father education = degree  6.54 
  (2.56) 
Father education = some higher education  7.23 
  (2.50) 
Father education = A-levels  9.27 
  (2.33) 
Father education = O-levels  7.34 
  (2.65) 
Father education = no O-levels  4.67 
  (2.22) 
 
(table continues next page) 
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Appendix Table A1 (cont.) 
Log Wage Regressions for 1999 Graduate Cohort Study, Full Set of Controls 
 
Degree Subject:   
 Humanities  1.66 
  (2.12) 
 Languages  7.52 
  (2.73) 
 Law  24.94 
  (3.57) 
 Social Sciences  6.77 
  (2.08) 
 Maths and Computing  26.51 
  (2.83) 
 Natural Sciences  1.58 
  (2.42) 
 Medicine and Related  27.02 
  (5.35) 
 Engineering  16.70 
  (1.92) 
 Business Studies  20.61 
  (2.62) 
 Education  16.73 
  (2.27) 
 Interdisciplinary  13.96 
  (4.35) 
 Other Vocational  13.34 
  (2.42) 
 Degree subject missing  8.91 
  (4.88) 
Observations  6465 
R-squared  0.12 
 
Note: This table reports coefficient estimates for the full set of controls used for the regression in Column 1, 
Table 4B. Coefficients reported and standard errors in parenthesis. All coefficients are multiplied by 100; and 
standard errors are clustered at the institution level. The institution quality measure, RAE, is normalised to have 
unit variance. For Degree Subject the omitted category is Arts degree.  
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Appendix Table A2: Instrumental Variable Strategy 
 
  OLS estimate  IV estimate 




















N  6465  6465 
Note: includes controls as in Table 4. All controls included. 
Coefficients are from separate regressions. In column 2, each quality measure is instrumented using all the other 
quality measures. 